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Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Europe is headed for a recession 
that will dwarf the economic downturn after the 2008 financial 
crisis. The impact on national defense sectors could be devas-
tating. But as crisis and responses are still in the early stage, 
governments can still take measures to mitigate the effect on 
defense. To safeguard political and defense priorities, EU and 
NATO States need to act jointly and decisively.
 – This crisis could deal the European defense sector its second 
major blow in ten years – and at a time when Europe’s security 
is more acutely threatened than at any stage since the end of 
the Cold War.
 – A range of different scenarios are plausible. In all of them, Euro-
pean cohesion is crucial to be able to mitigate the impact on the 
defense sector. Much will depend on US attitude toward NATO 
and Europe. 
 – The crisis also presents an opportunity to reassess the Euro-
pean defense strategy, refine priorities, and pursue arms control 
at a time when adversaries may become more open to such 
negotiations.
 – Germany should use its upcoming EU Presidency to lead the 
effort to shield key European defense and industrial capabili-
ties. It could propose a pragmatic redesign of instruments like 
the European Defense Fund and PESCO.
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FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: 
ANALOGIES AND ANOMALIES 
The fi ght against COVID-19 is causing an unprece-
dented economic crisis. Given the enormous pres-
sure currently building up on public budgets, this 
crisis could soon affect defense spending. When 
looking for guidance on what to expect and how to 
react, the 2008 financial crisis – which hit the de-
fense sector severely – offers useful insights. Still, 
the current crisis will be different: First, the magnitude 
of its fi nancial impact is expected to be much greater. 
Second, the European threat environment is far more 
challenging today, making the state’s core task of ef-
fective deterrence and defense more urgent than at 
any time since the end of the Cold War. 
The 2008 Financial Crisis
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis on public 
spending was immediate, massive, and long-last-
ing. As a consequence, the defense sector, i.e. armed 
forces structures, procurement, industries, and de-
1 Brune, Sophie-Charlotte and Mölling, Christian, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence, European Parliament, 2011, accessed April 3, 2020 
under https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110623ATT22404/20110623ATT22404EN.pdf.
 Fiott, Daniel, Will European defence survive Coronavirus?, Elcano Royal Institute, March 27, 2020, accessed April 3, 2020 under 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/commentary-fi ott-will-
european-defence-survive-coronavirus 
 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, accessed April 4, 2020 under https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/
weodata/index.aspx.
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database, accessed April 4, 2020 under https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
fense innovation, were hit hard. European defense 
budgets saw cuts of around 30 percent in smaller 
states, 10 to 15 percent in medium, and around 8 per-
cent in larger states.1 Overall, about EUR 24 billion – 
or about 11 percent of total defense spending – were 
cut in the years following 2007/2008.2
However, the handling of the crisis and the impact 
on the defense sector in different countries depend-
ed not only on the magnitude of the economic blow 
but also on the political priorities and traditions of 
national governments. Finland lost 10 percent of its 
GDP but did not scale down its defense budget. Slo-
vakia’s economy shrunk by less than 5 percent of its 
GDP, but the government cut defense spending by 
almost 30 percent. Overall, about half of European 
governments made defense cuts roughly reciprocal 
to the decreases in GDP, as fi gure 1 shows.
Even though defense budgets slowly recovered to-
ward pre-crisis levels after 2014, capabilities did 
not. Nationally as well as at EU and NATO level, sig-
FIGURE 1: EU28 GDP AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURE CHANGES 2008-2012 
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nificant gaps still exist. European armies have lost 
roughly 35 percent of their capabilities over the 
last two decades. Figure 2 shows that the ten years 
between 2009 and 2018 saw the most severe reduc-
tions, which in some cases even exceeded the equip-
ment cuts of the previous decade.
 
Four Factors in the Current Defense Crisis 
From 2020 onwards, European countries are like-
ly going to find themselves under a double strain: 
While public finances will come under stress, the 
need for continued or even increased defense invest-
ment will remain as the security environment dete-
riorates. We currently see four factors framing our 
scenarios, which will determine when and to what 
extent European defense will be impacted by the un-
folding crisis: 
• Public finance 
• The security environment
• The US contribution to transatlantic  
 deterrence and defense
• Institutional coherence and coordination  
 in European defense
Public Finance in European States  
First estimates by the OECD and national institu-
tions conclude that the initial economic impact of 
the measures to fight the COVID-19 virus will by far 
exceed that of the 2008 financial crisis.6 An OECD 
evaluation shows that the partial shutdowns in many 
countries could lead to an immediate 20 to 25 per-
cent decrease in national GDP.7 For Germany, the 
Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (Ifo) esti-
mates that the cost in terms of GDP loss could lie 
anywhere between EUR 255 and 729 billion depend-
ing on the duration of the economic shutdown.8
It is already clear that this crisis will put an unprec-
edented strain on public budgets as countries are 
struggling to reduce the economic blow. The se-
vere socio-economic consequences of the crisis may 
force governments to prioritize immediate economic 
relief over long-term strategic defense consider-
ations. As public debt rises, reducing defense spend-
ing may seem like an easy fix. This could develop into 
the second major hit to European defense budgets 
and the defense posture within a decade. Yet it is a 
5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, Volumes 100 (2000), 110 (2010), 119 (2019), London.
6 Dorn, Florian, Fuest, Clemens, Göttert, Marcell et al., Die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten des Corona-Shutdown für Deutschland: Eine Szenarienrechnung, 
Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e.V., March 2020, Munich, accessed April 6, 2020 under https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2020-
04-fuest-etal-volkswirtschaftliche-kosten-corona-2020-04-15.pdf, p.8.
7 OECD, Evaluating the initial impact of COVID-19 containment measures on economic activity, OECD, March 2020, accessed April 6, 2020 under https://read.
oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=126_126496-evgsi2gmqj&title=Evaluating_the_initial_impact_of_COVID-19_containment_measures_on_economic_activity , p.4.
8 Dorn/Fuest/Göttert 2020.
FIGURE 2: EU28 CHANGES IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT 1999-2018 (IN %)
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political decision to say if cuts in defense spending 
will be made and how substantial they should be. 
A Changing Strategic Environment 
Europe’s strategic environment is different today 
from what it was in 2008. In the 2000s, the major 
military engagements by Europeans were expedi-
tionary operations – and thus to some extent wars 
of choice. Today, Russia has re-emerged, threatening 
its neighbors more or less openly, and China is in-
creasingly posing a military challenge to Europe and 
the United States. Deterrence and defense have once 
again become core missions of NATO. 
However, this does not make crisis management in 
other parts of the world obsolete or less import-
ant: Europe cannot take a tough stance on Russia 
in the east and neglect the south. It is not possible 
for Europe to focus on just one pillar. It must ad-
dress deterrence, defense, and crisis management 
simultaneously.
Even beyond the military domain, Europe’s weakness 
can easily be exploited by competitors such as Russia 
and China. These powers are far from immune to the 
virus themselves, of course, and are already suffering 
from economic consequences such as declining oil 
prices in the case of Russia. But they won’t lose time 
to step into the vacuum left by European and Amer-
ican retrenchment – including in Europe itself.  Giv-
en the lack of US leadership in the global response 
to COVID-19, Beijing is currently positioning itself as 
the alternative provider of soft power. Beijing is pre-
senting an image of control and benevolence, deliv-
ering medical equipment and test kits to Europe and 
elsewhere, while the United States is barely able to 
handle the crisis at home.9
 
The US as a Wildcard
The United States remains a source of uncertain-
ty. Ever since Donald Trump took office, Europeans 
have doubted America’s commitment to the trans-
atlantic alliance and have started to strive for more 
autonomy. Even though the current administration 
has so far kept the US military posture in Europe in-
tact, a major economic recession in the United States 
could make Washington reconsider. The US defense 
budget will not be immune to economic pressure. In 
the 2010s, even the USA – which had retained high 
levels of military spending in the immediate after-
math of the crisis because of ongoing military en-
gagements – had to recognize the need to balance 
military spending with increasing national debt. 
Like in other countries, the consequences for the US 
defense budget will depend on the duration and the 
severity of the economic recession caused by the 
pandemic. A severe economic crisis during the pres-
idential race could cause significant electoral pres-
sure to reduce the defense budget and relieve ailing 
public finances. The current crisis could thus lead 
the US to speed up the retrenchment of its glob-
al posture. Facing hard economic choices, the US is 
likely to focus on China as the single biggest threat 
and retreat from Europe. This would leave Europeans 
with even more capability holes to patch. US com-
mitment to maintaining its nuclear umbrella may 
strongly depend on Europeans increasing their ef-
forts to ramp up their own capabilities. Political de-
cisions about European defense spending will need 
to take this into account. 
Institutional Coherence and Coordination  
in European Defense
While defense remains a national prerogative, no Eu-
ropean state has the size and resources to be effec-
tive on its own. Military power in Europe depends 
on multinational formations and coordination. Even 
when individual governments do operate nationally, 
they can only do so because they have allies at their 
back. Yet the 2008 financial crisis showed up severe 
shortcomings in institutional coherence. It was not 
just the euro which nearly fell victim to isolated na-
tional policies. Governments also decided to cut de-
fense spending nationally, putting what they thought 
of as “sovereignty” before military effectiveness. 
In the current crisis, the institutional challenge will 
be even greater as Britain, a major military power, 
9 Campell, Kurt M and Doshi, Rush, The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020, accessed April 6, 2020 under  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order
Russia and China  
won’t lose time to step 
into the vacuum
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has left the EU. Britain’s membership in NATO con-
tinues but cannot fully make up for the many close 
links between EU member states. Both the British 
government and EU countries have expressed the 
will to continue and possibly even intensify their co-
operation in defense matters, but this may prove 
very difficult at a time of exploding debt and rising 
nationalism.
For the purpose of this paper, we assume that Britain 
will continue to be part of European defense, both as 
a member of the European caucus of NATO and as a 
close associate of EU programs like PESCO. This is 
why the authors speak of Europe rather than the Eu-
ropean Union.
“MOVING TARGETS” – POSSIBLE  
SCENARIOS FOR CHANGE
At this stage, it is hard to predict specific outcomes. 
Any scenario outcome will be shaped by the four 
stressors described above: dwindling resources, a 
changing security environment, potential US re-
trenchment, and the issue of EU cohesion. The fol-
lowing four exploratory scenarios10 highlight these 
four stressors and their consequences for European 
defense, meaning its armed forces, defense industry, 
and military modernization. All four scenarios are 
built on the expectation that the economic situation 
will get worse.
Defense Sector Breakdown
In this scenario, the financial burden of the cri-
sis quickly becomes so devastating that virtually all 
European governments prioritize short-term so-
cio-economic spending over the medium/longer 
term responsibilities of the state, including security 
considerations. Smaller countries’ forces will become 
almost completely inoperable, with air forces col-
lapsing first due to their high maintenance and op-
erational costs – leaving allied air space unguarded 
at times. Country after country pulls its contin-
gents out of exercise and training rosters. While gov-
ernments try to coordinate through EU and NATO, 
there is not much left to coordinate. As some gov-
ernments are forced to declare bankruptcy, the re-
maining forces are needed for internal security tasks. 
The medium-term result is not a scale-down but a 
10 Given the early stage of this crisis and the larger number of unknowns, these scenarios are to be understood as exploratory in nature. They do not feature 
a clear distinction between independent and dependent variables. 
FIGURE 3: FOUR SCENARIOS  
FOR CHANGE
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breakdown of the European deterrence and defense 
posture, leaving Europe vulnerable. The security sit-
uation is tense as Russian analysts assume that the 
nuclear threshold has been lowered due to the loss 
of conventional capabilities. The challenge for bur-
den sharing and solidarity in the EU and in NATO 
will be to pick up the remaining pieces and rebuild 
a minimum credible posture. Some allies will not be 
able to contribute for a long time.
Industries will not only suffer from the immediate 
cuts but also from uncertainty over whether and 
when defense activities will resume. After the first 
shock, globally active European defense compa-
nies will start to leave Europe for places that offer 
more stability. European governments may be will-
ing to let them go – allowing them to export defense 
industrial know-how and production facilities – if 
they promise to supply goods and services for the 
next two decades at reduced prices. Uncompetitive 
companies will become national branches of non- 
European holders and produce in license. Another 
consequence of the economic vulnerability will be 
that foreign investors, especially from Asia, buy into 
critical parts of the European supply chain. 
Ami Goes Home
US withdrawal from Europe would be the most dev-
astating outcome in both economic and securi-
ty terms. In this scenario, the enormous strain that 
the fight against the pandemic puts on the US econ-
omy and the deep rift in US society result in strong 
political pressure to bring the troops home and to 
stop paying for European security. Those views were 
present among the American electorate prior to the 
pandemic11 but are widely held now as the United 
States is consumed by the fallout of the crisis. As a 
result, the United States is pulling out of NATO, leav-
ing Europeans to their own devices. 
Regardless of the development of European defense 
budgets, this scenario places an extreme burden on 
European governments. The security environment be-
comes more perilous as the US ends its commitment 
to European defense. The loss of the US nuclear um-
brella ignites an intra-European debate about nuclear 
deterrence. Given that Europe includes nuclear powers 
as well as countries that have signed and ratified the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, inter-
nal cohesion is strained. Both budget and nuclear de-
bates meet with political resistance in individual states.
This paradoxical situation of having to spend more 
while budgets are becoming tighter exacerbates po-
litical rifts between Europeans. Just as during the 
last crisis, Europeans have different spending priori-
ties. Diverging spending patterns impact defense in-
dustries differently across Europe. Procurement and 
modernization efforts become more and more asyn-
chronous in the mid-term. Those Europeans who 
spend consistently retain both forces and industry, 
while others cut back. Uncoordinated capability re-
tention wastes resources and weakens Europe’s ca-
pacity to act even further.
Inefficient Pooling and Sharing, Again
This scenario is built on Europe’s cardinal mistake 
during the last crisis: national instead of European 
decisions. European governments react to the finan-
cial challenge just as they did before – with unco-
ordinated changes to their armed forces. Domestic 
considerations take priority over the maintenance 
and generation of military capabilities and the re-
spective equipment procurement. Instruments like 
PESCO and EDF are only paid lip service to.
As seen over the last decade, coordination and soli-
darity are crucial to prevent the loss of critical niche 
capabilities. National cuts have system-wide conse-
quences, causing inefficiencies and damaging Eu-
rope’s military capacity to act. 
Only after a first wave of cuts will Europeans return 
to attempting some coordination within in EU and 
NATO. But as they lack a clear picture of who retains 
which capabilities, coordination becomes cumber-
some. Moreover, as this is the second round of cuts 
within a decade, there is not much left to pool. Force 
modernization increasingly turns into copying US ef-
forts with significantly smaller forces which will be 
11 Hannah, Mark, It’s Not Just Trump. The American People Are Skeptical of NATO, Too, Politico, December 03, 2019, accessed April 6, 2020 under  
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/03/not-just-trump-american-people-skeptical-nato-074813.  
The challenge will be 
to rebuild a minimum 
credible posture
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equipped with imported material. Consequently, Eu-
rope’s strategic autonomy decreases while its depen-
dency on the US increases. 
In this scenario, the United States continues to be 
committed to European security and NATO. The 
presence of US forces on the European continent re-
mains a strategic priority. However, NATO will not 
be able to function across the same wide spectrum 
as before. This could trigger another burden- and 
risk-sharing debate on the value of deterrence ver-
sus expeditionary operations and put a strain on in-
ternal cohesion.
European defense industrial capabilities suffer as 
domestic demand and investment into research and 
development (R&D) plummet. Moreover, the indus-
try’s ability to increase efficiency through transna-
tional M&A and economies of scale is constrained by 
heightened national sentiments. Companies decide 
to either aggressively internationalize, which means 
massively increasing defense exports, or to abandon 
production as the armed forces as an otherwise reli-
able client drop out. 
Solidarity First – Establish Lead Nations 
In our best-case scenario, we assume that the overall 
financial impact on defense budgets is mild and only 
a few countries will be hit more severely. Here, early 
political commitments by larger European countries 
soften the impact of the financial crisis on defense 
spending. The economic fallout of the pandemic 
has less severe effects on larger economies, en-
abling them to act early by taking on more nation-
al debt in order to retain their forces. Those forces 
constitute the anchor to which smaller armed forces, 
that are driven into more specialization by the crisis, 
can attach their capabilities. Available flexibility in 
the capability development plans is used to inte-
grate countries that fall temporarily behind. Such an 
arrangement, similar to NATO’s Framework Nation 
Concept, allows for a comparatively good balance of 
financial strain and retention of military capabilities. 
In a laudable display of leadership, commitment, and 
coordination Germany, France, and the UK make this 
approach work.
In order to protect the heart of European defense 
and deterrence, larger countries erect firewalls 
around critical military capabilities such as air-to-
air refueling, electronic warfare, air defense, etc. 
Smaller militaries are reassured that allies will retain 
capabilities which they themselves can no longer 
afford. Europeans take stock and will identify and re-
tire unnecessary capabilities and outdated equip-
ment. In order to provide modern equipment to 
armies that suffer disproportionally, European states 
introduce new contractual concepts. Larger coun-
tries can lease out equipment they have procured to 
support their industry. In turn, leading defense in-
dustrial companies include local suppliers in small-
er states in their supply chains to make such deals 
more appealing.
As a result, Europe does not increase its dependency 
on the US. Instead, it incentivizes a European con-
solidation of industrial capabilities, supply chains, 
and procurement programs with larger states as lead 
nations. Moreover, the retention of a large part of the 
initial military capabilities allows Europeans more 
flexibility in addressing new and existing threats.
TAKING THE RIGHT MEASURES  
EARLY ON
As the unprecedented economic fall-out of this crisis 
is starting to become apparent, it may seem tempt-
ing to curtail defense spending. But given the cur-
rent volatility in the world, it would be irresponsible 
to slash investment in risk prevention.
There is no automatism that sends European govern-
ments down the same path they took a decade ago. 
The world is just at the beginning of this crisis, and 
there is still time to shape the outcome of the cur-
rent development. Germany and Europe should em-
brace six recommendations:
Don’t Recycle the 2008 Playbook 
EU and NATO should prevent unilateral action. Un-
coordinated defense cuts would not only damage 
the alliance as a whole but also spread the narrative 
about countries free-riding on the back of other na-
tions’ efforts. Without proactive coordination or at 
least information-sharing, the capability landscape 
will get rougher, and misperception and distrust 
will grow. Given the size of European nations, there 
can be no such thing as a national defense anymore. 
Moreover, rebuilding capabilities is more costly than 
retaining them – another painful lesson from 2008.
EU and NATO should immediately convene for emer-
gency meetings. They should try to preempt develop-
ments and present several alternative scenarios and 
possible joint reactions. They should also show where 
national reactions can be useful and where they do 
Deterrence and Defense in Times of COVID-19: Europe’s Political Choices 
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harm. The objective at this early stage is to enable al-
lies to understand their roles and responsibilities and 
to allow for a collective search for solutions.
EU and NATO need to reactivate their cooperation. 
To enable EU instruments to be used effectively, EU 
and NATO states have to be fully aware of what is 
discussed and designed in response to the unfolding 
crisis on the other side of Brussels. 
Envisage the Next Generation of Defense Industrial 
Cooperation and Consolidation
Defense industries and technological innovation are 
also at risk due to the upcoming crisis. Similarly to 
the measures described above, a landscape of criti-
cal industries and technologies needs to be designed 
now. This will be difficult as there is no single au-
thority with the comprehensive authority and capa-
bility to deliver such an overview. Instead, national 
interests will bias the assessment. Still, depending on 
the magnitude of impact, the crisis will offer an op-
portunity for restructuring and strengthening Eu-
rope’s defense technological and industrial base. 
A new design, however, cannot be based on cuts 
alone. Therefore European procurement projects of a 
sufficient size to have a structural impact on the de-
fense industrial sector should be envisaged early on. 
It is an old idea: increase the efficiency of invested 
resources through centralization and the economies 
of scale and learning.  Even though NATO and Europe 
have a long track record of successful cooperation 
projects, political inertia has so far impeded fur-
ther progress. However, this crisis offers a chance to 
overcome national sentiment in organizational and 
defense industrial cooperation. It should be seized, 
even though political resistance is to be expected – 
in this economic crisis, domestic jobs tied to defense 
production will be considered all the more valuable.
Another obstacle is the firewall that traditional-
ly separates civilian and military R&D in Europe. It 
took the triple crisis of Ukraine, Brexit, and President 
Donald Trump’s doubts about NATO to even partial-
ly overcome this blockade and to channel EU funds 
toward military R&D. So while cutting investment 
in R&D may seem like an easy fix, decision makers 
should be aware of the dire consequences for the 
next generation of defense solutions.
Rethink Strategy: Adapt the Level of Ambition
Strategy implies a constant adjustment between ob-
jectives and means. With fewer means available, ob-
jectives need to be downsized, or means have to be 
used more creatively. Hence, EU and NATO should 
consider lowering their level of ambition. An alter-
native would be to employ other means to achieve 
objectives: Conflict has already spilled out of the con-
ventional military domain. If military means prove 
more expensive or less effective than alternative 
ones, it is prudent to consider a more comprehen-
sive way to engage in conflicts and deter adversaries. 
Such a comprehensive conflict strategy could build 
on the lessons learned from hybrid warfare and for-
eign influence operations against Europe. 
Embrace the Opportunity for Arms Control 
A crisis in military spending provides an opportuni-
ty to develop and implement innovative methods and 
ideas for arms control. As COVID-19 will negative-
ly impact the economic situation of many countries, 
including that of adversaries, arms control mea-
sures may gain appeal as a means to reduce defense 
spending. In combination with very low oil prices, 
Russia may not be able to continue with its current 
modernization plans. This goes for both conventional 
and nuclear armament. Moreover, the US is only now 
beginning its nuclear modernization which certainly 
has the potential to give Russia pause. Depending on 
the US financial outlook, negotiations among Mos-
cow and Washington may become more likely.
Capitalize on Germany’s EU Presidency to Shape 
the EU Response
Germany takes over the EU presidency in July. This 
may have looked like a routine job – until now. The 
fact that the largest EU economy, the largest defense 
spender, and the second largest military force in the 
EU takes over in midst of the crisis gives Berlin lever-
age to shape outcomes in the defense realm. 
Germany could propose adapting the European De-
fense Industrial Development Program and the Euro-
pean Defense Fund to enable countries to safeguard 
critical capabilities. Both instruments should also be 
considered for developing and deploying innovative 
This crisis offers a 
chance to overcome  
national sentiment
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means of conflict on the basis of the comprehensive 
conflict strategy outlined above. As Germany has 
led the work on PESCO, it should also come up with 
ideas for adapting PESCO the new realities of the 
post-COVID-19 world. Moreover, innovative financ-
ing models could be developed with the EU cover-
ing the cost for maintenance or lease of systems. The 
EU could even become the operator, e.g. for routine 
transport planes and some infrastructure. All mea-
sures should be open to non-EU Europeans. 
Safeguard the Transatlantic Partnership
The US remains the biggest single provider of Euro-
pean defense. Given NATO’s integrated approach to 
transatlantic security, the European should make a 
particular effort to help US citizens as their cities are 
becoming hotspots of COVID-19. It would be a strong 
sign of transatlantic solidarity if European countries 
that have been less touched by the virus could quick-
ly send medical personnel to the US. Helping the 
United States get through this health crisis now may 
prevent a defense crisis in Europe later. 
Moreover, as transatlantic procurement contracts 
come under pressure, Europeans should try switch-
ing to leasing models instead of canceling. This 
would allow them to avoid damage to their own ca-
pability development and to US suppliers as well as 
to the political relationship.
CONCLUSION
Europe can still shape its own destiny: As crisis and 
response are still at an early stage, heads of govern-
ments and defense ministers can mitigate the effect 
on defense, if they put the right strategies in place 
now. Germany’s upcoming EU presidency – if prop-
erly prepared for now – offers a genuine opportu-
nity to avoid the mistakes made after the financial 
crisis of 2008. Europe would then have a chance to 
come out of the COVID-19 crisis with its security in-
tact and possibly even strengthened.
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